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Creditor's Rights and Security Transactions-
1964 Tennessee Survey
Forrest W. Lacey*
As in most years, there were only a few cases in this area decided
in 1964. Three involved bankruptcy. In re Leeds Homes, Inc.'
presented the question of the allowance, in a reorganization proceed-
ing under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, of a claim fled by a
Delaware corporation doing business in Tennessee without qualifying
as a foreign corporation as required by Tennessee law.2 Several
Tennessee decisions have held that such corporations cannot enforce
contracts in the Tennessee courts.3 In some of these decisions it is
stated that such contracts are void.4 In others they are said to be
not void, but unenforceable.5
In allowing the claim the district court relied on two alternative
grounds:
(1) that under Tennessee law a contract of a non-qualifying corporation is
not void but merely unenforceable in state courts, and that failure of the
offending corporation to domesticate is not a good defense against it in a
case where jurisdiction is based, not on diversity, but on federal bankruptcy
law; and (2) that, in any event, the particular loan in question was an
interstate transaction and therefore T.C.A. § 48-908 was not applicable, since
by its terms it applies only to intrastate business.
6
The court of appeals affirmed the district court decision solely on the
first ground, and expressly refrained from passing on the second
ground.
7
It is now well established that federal, and not state law will be
applied in determining the allowability of claims in bankruptcy
proceedings.8 The court noted, however, that the preliminary question
of whether or not a claim exists, to which federal law is then applied,
* Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. 332 F.2d 648 (6th Cir. 1964).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-901 to -1804 (1956).
3. See, e.g., Peck-Williamson Heating & Ventilating Co. v. McKnight & Merz, 140
Tenn. 563, 205 S.W. 419 (1918).
4. Ibid.
5. See, e.g., Swope v. Jordan, 107 Tenn. 166, 64 S.W. 52 (1901).
6. In re Leeds Homes, Inc., supra note 1, at 649.
7. As to this ground, see Lloyd Thomas Co. v. Grosvenor, 144 Tenn. 347, 233 S.W.
669 (1920).
8. See cases cited in In re Leeds Homes, Inc., supra note 1, at 649.
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must be determined with reference to state law.
On the question of the existence of a claim under state law, the
court concluded that in Tennessee contracts and transactions of non-
qualifying foreign corporations are not void, but are unenforceable.
Therefore, the court held that a claim existed which should be
allowed in a bankruptcy proceeding, although it would not have
been enforceable in the courts of Tennessee.
In re Crosson,9 another bankruptcy case, involved a determination
of Tennessee law as to encumbrances on automobiles. The bankrupt,
five weeks before bankruptcy, bought a used car. The purchase was
financed by a conditional sales contract and promissory note which
the seller negotiated to a finance company. The bill of sale furnished
the buyer showed on its face the lien of the finance company. The
buyer did not apply for or obtain a new certificate of title, although
required by state law to do so.10 The finance company filed a claim
in the bankruptcy proceeding asserting a valid lien. But the court held
the company's lien to be inferior to the trustee's status as a lien
creditor.
The Bankruptcy Act gives the trustee, as of the date of bankruptcy,
the rights of a lien creditor whether or not such creditors actually
exist." Yet, the rights of such a lien creditor and his status relative
to other conflicting interests are determined by state law. Under
Tennessee law encumbrances on automobiles, other than liens de-
pendent on possession, must be noted on the certificate of title to be
valid against creditors, purchasers or encumbrancers in the absence
of actual knowledge.' 2 In the instant case, although the encumbrance
was noted on the bill of sale, it was not noted on the title since the
buyer never applied for a new title. Therefore, the court held that
the lien was not valid against the trustee as a lien creditor.
The opinion does not indicate whether or not the finance company
had filed a request for notation of the lien. If not, the decision seems
correct because the failure of the buyer to apply for title would then
have no significant effect. But if the lien holder complied with the
law by attempting a proper perfecting of his security interest and
was defeated by the failure of the buyer to perform a mandatory
duty under the statute, the result seems anomolous. In actual practice
most dealers in fact apply for the new title on behalf of the buyer.
Where this is done the problem of the instant case cannot arise. But,
as the statute imposes the duty of such application solely on the buyer,
what would happen if the buyer refused to allow the dealer to apply
9. 226 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
10. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-301 to -1504 (1956).
11. 66 STAT. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1958).
12. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-326, -327 (1956).
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for the title. Presumably, if discovered, the buyer could be compelled
to apply for the title, but dUring the time prior to such application the
lien holder apparently could not obtain a perfected security interest. It
should be noted that this situation will continue under the new
Uniform Commercial Code,13 for the Code continues the old method
of perfecting a security interest in an automobile classified as con-
sumer goods.14 Possibly, the vehicle registration act should be
amended so as to allow dealers or encumbrancers to apply for title
so that they can be sure their lien is properly registered.
The third case involved the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy, or
more specifically, the extent to which a court will go outside the
record to determine whether or not a particular debt is dischargeable.
In Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Woodmansee,15 a judgment on a
note had been scheduled in a bankruptcy proceeding in which a
discharge was granted. Subsequent to this discharge C.I.T., the
judgment creditor, caused an execution to be issued on its judgment,
and had garnishment served on the bankrupt's employer. A plea of
discharge was entered, but C.I.T. replied that the judgment was not
dischargeable because the note on which it was based had been
given to evidence a liability created by fraud while acting in a
fiduciary capacity.16 The reply alleged that the note was given in
settlement of a controversy which arose while C.I.T. was financing
Woodmansee as a car dealer in purchasing automobiles upon trust
receipts. The chancellor upheld the plea of discharge on the ground
that he could not go behind the record of the judgment to determine
the nature of the liability, and that the record did not show that the
judgment was non-dischargeable.
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the chancellor. In
the opinion the court distinguished going behind the note and going
behind the judgment on the note. In the latter case, the court said
that even though the cause of action is not merged in the judgment,
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show that a judgment is not
affected by a discharge in bankruptcy. The opinion relied on and
quoted from another opinion, 7 as follows:
'In the case at bar there is nothing in the record to show any nondis-
chargeable feature of the obligation. It is a money judgment on the note so
far as the record shows. We believe the better view is as announced in the
note, supra, that the judgment creditor should not be permitted to go
13. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1-101 to -9-507 (1956).
14. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-302 (1956).
15. 374 S.W.2d 386 (Tenn. 1964).
16. Such a debt would be excepted from discharge under § 17 of the Bankruptcy
Act. 52 STAT. 851 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1958).




behind the judgment to show the nondischargeable feature of the obligation.
For these reasons the obligation being dischargeable in bankruptcy as shown
by the record of the judgment, it is conclusive on the judgment creditor
and he is not permitted to go behind the judgment. '18
The only non-bankruptcy case is Atlas Finance Co. v. Wilkerson."0
It presents interesting questions relative to federal tax liens and
security interests in automobiles.
Finance Co. made a loan to one Dallosta on May 17, 1960, secured
by a chattel mortgage on Dallosta's automobile. This lien was prop-
erly recorded on the certificate of title to the automobile. In
December 1960 the United States government seized the auto to be
sold in satisfaction of the government's lien for taxes. Wilkerson
purchased at the tax sale. Finance Co. then attempted to replevy the
auto from Wilkerson. Replevin was denied and on appeal this deci-
sion was affirmed.
Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code20 imposes a lien in
favor of the United States for all unpaid taxes on all property of the
delinquent taxpayer. Section 6323(a) provides that this lien will not
be valid against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or judgment
creditor unless notice thereof has been properly filed. The state may
designate the proper place of filing, and Tennessee has so designated
the office of the Register of Deeds in the county in which the property
is located.
21
The tax liens involved in this case had been filed in the proper office
prior to 1960. The Tennessee Motor Vehicle Act,22 however, requires
that encumbrances or liens on automobiles be noted on the certificate
of title. It further provides that except for liens dependent on
possession, notation on the title shall be the exclusive method of
constructive notice of a lienm3 and that no lien not so noted shall be
valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers. 24 Thus, there
is clearly a conflict between the Motor Vehicle Act and the federal
tax lien statute.
In affirming the denial of replevin the Tennessee Supreme Court
relied upon a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court.25
That decision was believed to require the holding that the federal
tax lien was valid despite the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act.
18. 374 S.W.2d 390-91.
19. 382 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1964).
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2110 (1956).
22. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-101 to -1504 (1956).
23. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-327 (1956).
24. TENN. CODE ANN. 8 59-326 (1956).
25. United States v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291 (1961).
1128 [ VOL. 18
CREDITORS' PIGHTS
Therefore, as the federal tax liens were prior in time they were held
to have priority over the security interest of the Finance Co.
The impact of this decision will be lessened by a 1964 amendment
to section 6323,26 although the amendment was held inapplicable to
the instant case on the ground that it should not be given retroactive
application. The amendment makes an exception in case of motor
vehicles, and provides that even though a federal tax lien under
section 6321 has been filed in the manner prescribed by 6323, it shall
not be valid with respect to motor vehicles:
[Als against any purchaser of such motor vehicle for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth if-(A) at the time of the purchase
the purchaser is without notice or knowledge of the existence of such lien,
and (B) before the purchaser obtains such notice or knowledge, he has
acquired possession of such motor vehicle and has not thereafter relinquished
possession of such motor vehicle to the seller or his agent 27
It should be noted, however, that this exception is applicable only
in favor of purchasers who take and keep possession of the motor
vehicle. In view of the strict interpretation the courts have given the
word "purchasers" as used in section 6323, it is doubtful if the amend-
ment would ever be applicable in favor of an encumbrancer. Almost
certainly it would not be unless the encumbrancer had obtained
possession of the vehicle before the United States attempted to enforce
its lien.
26. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(d).
27. Ibid.
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